



CITY OF SAINT PAUL

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October 23, 2006

The Honorable Carlos M. Gutierrez
 Secretary of Commerce
 U.S. Department of Commerce
 14th Street and Constitution Avenue, N.W.
 Washington, D.C. 20230

Re: Continuing Fishery Resource Disaster in the Bering Sea Snow Crab Fishery

Dear Mr. Secretary:

The City of Saint Paul of the Pribilof Island Community of Saint Paul, Alaska, ("the City") hereby petitions for a determination, pursuant to Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, 16 U.S.C. 1861(a) (2005) (hereafter "the Magnuson-Stevens Act"), that a commercial fishery failure in the Bering Sea snow crab fishery has occurred in the 2005 and 2006 fisheries due to a fishery resource disaster. The Section 312 determination requested herein would be a continuation of the Department's Section 312 determinations made on May 11, 2000, November 29, 2001, November 13, 2002 (announced January 17, 2003), and February 10, 2005.

A Section 312(a) determination would authorize the Secretary, through additional appropriations, to continue the work commenced under NOAA's previous fisheries disaster determinations, including the assessment of the economic and social effects of the commercial fishery failure, and the efforts of industry, NMFS, and the North Pacific Fishery Management Council ("NPFMC") to restore the fishery and assist the fishing communities affected by the failure. We submit that the information presented herein supports this determination.

I. A Fishery Resource Disaster in the Bering Sea Snow Crab Resource Continued to Manifest Itself in the 2005 and 2006 Fisheries.

The Bering Sea snow crab fishery, which was the subject of the year 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2004 commercial fishery failure determinations, has continued in a state of severe decline. In the most recent determination, in February 2005, Assistant Administrator William T. Hogarth announced NMFS's determination that:

... the situation that was the basis for commercial fishery failure determinations in May 2000, November 2001, and October 2002,

continued in 2003 and 2004 to constitute a commercial fishery failure under section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act.¹

National Marine Fisheries Service ("NMFS") trawl survey data confirm that the Bering Sea snow crab stocks had not recovered to any significant extent in 2005 and 2006, which is reflected in the continued low Guideline Harvest Levels ("GHL") determined by the State of Alaska, which manages the crab fishery:

	<u>GHL (million lbs.)</u>
1999	196
2000	28.6
2001	27.3
2002	30.82
2003	25.61
2004	20.8
2005	20.92
2006	37.18 (TAC for 2005/2006 fishery) ²

The 2003 total GHL of 25.61 million pounds represented a drop of approximately 17 percent from the 2002 total GHL of 30.82 million pounds. This was followed by an additional 19 percent decline from 2003 to 2004. The GHL set for 2005 was almost identical to the low harvest level of 2004. As we have identified in previous requests, the declines in and continued depressed levels of GHL in recent years are particularly dramatic when viewed in relation to 1999 GHL, and the 85% reduction that occurred from 1999 to 2000, the first year of the crab disaster. Thus, while the Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for 2006 represented a higher volume than the GHL for 2005, the 2006 TAC remains substantially (81%) below the 1999 GHL.³

This analysis is supported by reports on NMFS' 2005 and 2006 Eastern Bering Sea Trawl Surveys, which found some increases in the categories of Bering Sea Snow Crab in recent years, but determined that the overall stock was below average and not rebuilding to any significant degree. The 2006 Crab SAFE Report provided the following summary assessment of the Bering Sea snow crab fishery:

¹ Letter to The Honorable Simeon Swetzof, Mayor, City of Saint Paul from William T. Hogarth, Ph.D. (undated letter transmitted in February 2005) (*NMFS 2005 Determination*).

² Includes CDQ. Alaska Department of Fish and Game Commercial Fisheries News Release (September 29, 2005), <http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region4/news/2005/nr092905bs2.pdf>.

³ Moreover, on September 29, 2006, the Alaska Department of Fish and Game and the National Marine Fisheries Service announced the total allowable catch for the 2006/2007 Bering Sea snow crab fishery at 38.57 million pounds - 1.7 percent lower than the previous year's fishery. Alaska Department of Fish and Game Commercial Fisheries News Release (September 29, 2006) <http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/region4/news/2006/nr0929a06.pdf>.

This stock in 2006 is, at 547.6-million pounds, above MSST [(minimum stock size threshold)] but slightly [10 percent] below the estimate for 2005 (610.7-million pounds). The estimated TMB [(total mature biomass)] in 2006 remains below the rebuilt level (it is 59% of the 'rebuilt' level of 921.6-million pounds) and maintains the trend in TMB of 'hovering about' MSST for the last 8 surveys without any apparent trend towards rebuilding.⁴

The 2006 report includes the following data summary by category of snow crab:

The abundance index of large males doubled relative to that in 2005. Pre-recruit male abundance was unchanged. Large female abundance decreased, and apparent recruitment to the female component of the stock is seen at the lower end of the mature size range. Except for the large and pre-recruit male categories, all sex-specific size categories declined relative to 2005; total males declined by 32%, females by 43%, and the overall population by 38%. Recruitment to female reproductive stock is evidenced by high frequencies of old and very old shell crab, which is of concern in terms of expected reproductive output. Estimated total mature biomass has been oscillating slightly above and below the MSST threshold since 1999. Mature biomass declined in 2006 relative to 2005 but remains above MSST. The stock is considered to be in the over fished level of abundance. Under the current rebuilding plan and harvest strategy the fishery would be closed if the stock fell below 50% MSST.⁵

The 2006 report reiterates that, "regardless of the increase in estimated abundance of males ≥ 4 -inches CW [carapace width (large males)] the 2006 standard survey area-swept estimates provide no strong evidence that the stock currently or potentially rebuilding."⁶

The 2005 Crab SAFE Report provided the following outlook for snow crab:

Large males stable but pre-recruit males increased substantially along with large females. Apparently increasing recruitment at the lower end of the mature size range has increased spawning biomass to levels above MSST in 2005 but the stock is still well below average. Reproductive population estimates that slightly

⁴ 2006 Crab SAFE Report at 1-2 (emphasis added). The report does note, however, that "[p]erhaps the most hopeful sign for rebuilding from the 2006 survey is that, since 1999, 2006 is the first year that estimated TMB has been above MSST for 2 years in a row."

⁵ 2006 Crab SAFE Report at 3-3 (emphasis added).

⁶ *Id.* at 1-3.

exceeded MSST in 2001 were well below the MSST in 2002, 2003 and 2004. Under the current rebuilding plan and harvest strategy the fishery would be closed if the stock fell below 50% MSST.

As discussed, *supra*, the 2005 SAFE Report estimated the TMB for Bering Sea snow crab in 2005 to be 610.7 million pounds, which was above the MSST of 460.8 million pounds defined by the NPFMC's *Fishery Management Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crabs (FMP)*.⁷ While that report noted that the 2005 TMB level, "the highest since the over fished declaration of 1999," is encouraging, it also emphasized that "the [Bering Sea snow crab] TMB estimated for 2005 remains [51 percent] below the 'rebuilt' level of BMSY [921.6 million pounds] and is lower than each of the TMBs estimated annually for 1987-1998. Hence the stock remains in over fished condition in 2005."⁸ In summary, the 2005 report found that "[d]espite an increase in spawning biomass in 2005, this stock remains in a depressed condition."⁹ The 2006 Crab SAFE Report provides a consistent assessment.¹⁰

II. The Implementation of the Crab Rationalization Program Should Not Prevent the Secretary from Determining that the Disaster Evidenced in Past Years is Continuing

In its 2005 recommendation regarding a determination under Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, NMFS stated that the while the fishery resource failure "may continue for an undetermined period of time," the Alaska Region

recognizes that the Crab Rationalization Program, which will be in place for the 2006 snow crab fishery, could mitigate many of the negative economic consequences of the low snow crab abundance of Saint Paul. Therefore, we do not anticipate finding a

⁷ 2005 Crab Safe Report at 1-3.

⁸ *Id.* But see National Marine Fisheries Service, *2005 Report on Status of Fisheries* (June 30, 2006) ("*Bering Sea Snow crab* is not overfished."). The NMFS report contains little analysis to support this conclusion, but indicates that the stock of Bering Sea Snow crab "is currently above the minimum stock size threshold; however, it was previously below this level and rebuilding must continue until the stock is at a level consistent with MSY." *Id.* at ST-17, n.1. The apparent difference in conclusions on the issue of overfishing reached by the 2005 SAFE Report and the 2005 NMFS report is particularly confusing given the fact that the NMFS report cites the 2005 SAFE Report as the "[s]ource document for stock assessment or other status determination information" with respect to Bering Sea snow crab. *Id.* at AT-18. Despite this apparent discrepancy, the data in the SAFE report clearly indicate a continued depressed state of snow crab stocks.

⁹ 2005 Crab Safe Report at 1-3.

¹⁰ The cause of the collapse of the Bering Sea crab stocks remains undetermined. NMFS findings have suggested that the decline in the stocks is due to natural and environmental factors and not to fisheries management policies. See 66 Fed. Reg. 742, 742-46 (Jan. 4, 2001) (discussing NMFS' approval of the Snow Crab Rebuilding Plan, Amendment 14 to the Fisheries Management Plan for Bering Sea/Aleutian Islands King and Tanner Crab).

continuation of a commercial fishery failure in 2006, or thereafter, unless new information about the snow crab fishery comes to light.¹¹

The 2006 and 2005 Crab SAFE Reports include studies of the market for snow crab harvested in Alaska, and include several findings regarding factors that affect revenues of the Alaska snow crab industry that are relevant to our request.¹² We submit that this information, together with the other data presented in this request, constitute "new information" that supports a determination that the snow crab commercial fishery failure is continuing.

The 2005 study notes the dramatic declines in harvest volumes that the Bering Sea snow crab fishery has experienced since 2000. In addition, "[f]urther complicating the economic health of the Alaska snow crab industry are increases in snow crab harvests from eastern Canada," which have "steadily increased from 21.6 million pounds in 1973 to 235.5 million pounds in 2002."¹³ The study noted that the volume of Canadian snow crab landings in 2004 was approximately ten times the volume of snow crab landings in Alaska, and noted a parallel pattern of growing disparity in terms of ex-vessel revenues.¹⁴

Unlike the declines experienced by the Bristol Bay king crab fishery in the late 1980s, which were reversed when the industry turned to snow crab, the snow crab industry has no "lucrative alternative" available, according to the study presented in the 2005 SAFE Report.

With no substantial increases to snow crab GHJ (or TAC under crab rationalization) on the horizon, and additional concerns that in any given year the fishery may close, the Alaska crab fleet is hard pressed to solely rely on the snow crab fishery as its economic base in the future. This has come at a time when the Alaska crab fleet is already economically vulnerable. The depressed conditions of the Alaska crab fisheries have ramifications beyond those accruing to harvesters. Crab has been a principal product for many Alaska processors and communities [like Saint Paul]. Processors have built necessary capacity, much of it in remote areas, to meet the needs of the Alaska crab fisheries.¹⁵

¹¹ NMFS 2005 Determination at 4-5.

¹² Greenberg and Herrmann, *Market Models for Alaska Snow Crab and King Crab: The Effects of Foreign Competition* (2006) (Crab SAFE Report at 7-1) and Greenberg and Herrmann, *Alaska Crab Market Models* (September 2005) (2005 Crab SAFE Report at 8-1).

¹³ *Id.*

¹⁴ *Id.*

¹⁵ *Id.* at 8-2.

The 2005 study anticipates that the crab rationalization program will result in a "major 'shake-out'" within the Alaska crab industry. Nevertheless, and while the study was based on pre-rationalization data, the authors note that

[t]o the extent that crab prices may increase post-rationalization the estimated exvessel revenues may be considered a lower-bound on post-rationalization exvessel revenues. It is highly doubtful that Alaska crab exvessel prices will rise to the extent that post-IFQ halibut prices did as the U.S. dominates the Pacific halibut supply whereas Canada dominates the snow (Queen) crab supply. However, some price increase may result.¹⁶

The 2006 study notes that there have been "fundamental changes to the industry structure" and other factors that challenge the continued prosperity of Alaska's crab fisheries.¹⁷ These factors include "declines to biomass and landings levels for most Alaska crab species," the fact that the "industry has had to transit to world crab markets that are now dominated by snow crab and king crab from Canada, Russia and Greenland," and the Crab Rationalization program.¹⁸

The data analyzed in this report relating to changes in the world market for snow crab indicate, on one hand, that "[b]iologically supported increases in Alaska snow crab harvests will increase snow crab revenue," but also that "the Alaska crab industry can no longer rely on increased snow crab prices to mitigate the economic affects of decreased harvests. Decreases in Alaska snow crab harvests will decrease industry revenues."

Congressional approval of the crab rationalization program in January of 2004 set the stage for ending the derby style crab fishery and will allow for consolidation of harvesting and processing activity in the Bering Sea. As the main port in the designated northern region of the Bering Sea, Saint Paul stands to benefit from this program – but only if the crab stocks return to healthy levels. The rationalization program requires that specific shares of six Bering Sea crab fisheries must be landed in Saint Paul.¹⁹

However, at present, only two of the six crab fisheries are open. Of those two, snow crab, as we have discussed, is at historic lows, and BBRKC stocks are

¹⁶ *Id.* at 8-3.

¹⁷ 2006 Crab SAFE Report at 7-1.

¹⁸ *Id.*

¹⁹ Those fisheries are: a) Bering Sea snow crab (*opilio*); b) Bristol Bay red king crab (BBRKC); c) Saint Matthews Blue King Crab; d) Pribilof red king crab; e) Pribilof blue king crab; and f) Bering Sea bairdi crab.

"rebuilding," therefore limiting harvest rates in both open fisheries. The other four crab fisheries are closed, but should they reopen, their small stock levels will limit their potential economic benefit to the City. While NMFS may allow limited fisheries due to the enhanced monitoring and regulatory framework created by the crab rationalization program, the limited economic activity that may be generated under the new framework will necessarily be circumscribed by stock levels and will be insufficient to create stable and year round revenue flows.

II. Saint Paul Continues to Experience Significant Economic Losses Due to the Depressed Condition of the Snow Crab Commercial Fishery

As discussed above, the GHL for snow crab in 2005 and 2006 was set well below the 1999 harvest level of 196 million pounds. Moreover, the 2005 commercial snow crab fishery (the most recent year for which data is available, continued the trend of low crab prices. At an average ex-vessel price of \$1.81 per pound, the total value of the 2005 snow crab fishery was approximately \$45 million.²⁰ This compares to an overall fishery value in excess of \$58 million in 2000, and over \$177 million in 1999.²¹ We note, as well, that the ex-vessel value of the snow crab fisheries in 2005 was lower than in 2004 (\$49 million) and 2003 (\$52 million).²² Consequently, Saint Paul continues to struggle with the substantial loss in revenues that result from these reductions.

Saint Paul is a fisheries-based community, located in the middle of the crab grounds and within 65 miles of 55% of the U.S. commercial fisheries. Since 1995, Saint Paul Harbor has been the primary crab processing location in the Bering Sea and the number two fishing port in Alaska in generating sales and fish tax revenues for the State of Alaska. In 1998 and 1999, crab deliveries to Saint Paul Harbor exceeded 40% of the total harvest.

Saint Paul's economy is almost entirely dependent on the crab resource. Crab landings and processing accounted for 85% of the cash entering the community in 2005. The City receives a 3% sales tax on crab delivered to and processed by floating processors within three nautical miles of the Island and a 3% sales tax on crab delivered inside the Harbor for processing. Saint Paul also receives half of the fisheries revenues that the State receives as a 3% - 5% tax on vessels fishing outside and inside of the harbor. In addition, the City receives sales tax on fuel and supplies sold in the Harbor, and derives revenue and jobs from the crab fishery in-harbor processors and service support to the crab vessels calling on Saint Paul.

²⁰ <http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfish/05value.php>.

²¹ Moreover, our previous request reviewed the dramatic decline in the catch history from 1990 to 2001, in the context of which the 1999 benchmark harvest is significantly below the recent highs of 1991 - 1993.

²² <http://www.cf.adfg.state.ak.us/geninfo/shellfish/05value.php>.

The total loss in revenues to the city, based on the fisheries collapse in 2004, 2005, and 2006 as compared to 1999, was 84%, 84%, and 86%.²³ These losses were reflected in continued depressed revenues in several major areas of City revenues – onshore processor revenues, offshore processing, fuel distributors, harbor services, and local businesses – which have not risen to any significant degree from the first year of the fishery collapse in 2000. Those losses are summarized in the following chart as follows (rounded to the nearest thousandth dollar and percentage point):²⁴

Revenue Source	1999	2000	2004	2005	2006	Revenue Decline 1999 to 2000	Revenue Decline 1999 to 2004	Revenue Decline 1999 to 2005	Revenue Decline 1999 to 2006
Onshore Processors	782	113	178	191	194	86%	77%	76%	75%
Offshore Processors	1,935	298	272	230	135	85%	86%	88%	93%
Fuel Distributors	85	11	20	28	42	87%	76%	67%	51%
Harbor Services	759	78	69	94	91	90%	91%	88%	88%
Local Businesses	110	60	60	47	45	45%	45%	57%	59%
TOTAL	3,671	560	599	590	507	85%	84%	84%	86%

These revenue losses have been felt directly by the Island's 405 native Aleut inhabitants through loss of jobs, loss of community health and safety services, loss of the community day care facilities, and curtailment in air passenger, cargo and bypass services to the mainland.

As of the date of this letter, the City officially has 38 employees. The population of the Island is currently some 488 residents, as some people have moved off the Island due to lack of work and opportunities. The departure particularly hurts the long-term viability of the Island, as many of those leaving are educated, skilled, and young. Strengthening of basic infrastructure that will expand the fisheries-based economy is crucial to retaining the younger generation and ensuring the long-term vitality of the Island.

²³ The percentage figures cited in this paragraph and the accompanying chart are rounded to the nearest percentage point, and value data is rounded to the nearest \$1,000.

²⁴ Chart created from data in Exhibit 1 to this letter. These figures do not include other revenue sources which are not dependent on the condition of the Opilio crab harvests.

VI. A Determination of a Commercial Fishery Resource Disaster In 2005 and 2006 is Needed to Provide Assistance under the Guidelines of Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act

Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act authorizes the Secretary to exercise discretion in determining whether there is a commercial fishery failure due to a fishery resource disaster as a result of:

- a. natural causes;
- b. man-made causes beyond the control of fishery managers to mitigate through conservation and management measures; or
- c. undetermined causes.

Such a determination would authorize the Secretary to provide funds appropriated for the purpose,

for assessing the economic and social effects of the commercial fishery failure, or any activity that the Secretary determines is appropriate to restore the fishery or prevent a similar failure in the future and to assist a fishing community affected by such failure.

As discussed in sections I through III above, the elements necessary for a commercial fishery failure resource disaster are present in the continuing collapse of the Bering Sea snow crab resource. Significant efforts at national, regional, and community levels currently underway to address the fisheries resource disaster in the crab fisheries need to be continued into the future. A determination that the snow crab fishery resource disaster continued in 2005 and 2006 will make this possible.

At the national level, additional funding is needed for research regarding the biology of snow crab and crab habitat to assist the fisheries managers in developing responsive management measures.²⁵ At a regional and community level, the State of Alaska administered the 2000 Opilio Disaster Project with funds appropriated for "emergency expenses for fisheries disaster relief . . . for the Pribilof Islands and East Aleutian area of the Bering Sea."²⁶ The City of Saint Paul used its share of the disaster relief funds on three complementary water projects to increase the available water supply to allow multispecies processing on Saint Paul Island for increased economic stability resulting from reduced dependence on crab processing: (1) a study of the sole

²⁵ See 66 Fed. Reg. 742, 742-46 (Jan. 4, 2001) (addressing public comments to the Snow Crab Rebuilding Plan and noting NMFS' need for additional scientific research, when funding is available).

²⁶ The affected fishing communities in the Pribilof Islands and the East Aleutian Islands agreed among themselves to an appropriate division of the funds. The State of Alaska, through the Department of Community and Economic Development, is administering a community grant program which approves eligible projects consistent with Section 312 requirements that the funding be used to assist in the restoration of the fishery or prevention of similar failures in the future.

source Island Aquifer; (2) construction of a new water tank to provide adequate water for processing with retained storage for fire fighting; and (3) improvements in the efficiency of water distribution to the harbor through replacement of failing sections of the old harbor water line with a new, larger, modern line to increase the volume of water to the harbor.

While these water projects will help solidify some of the infrastructure on Saint Paul Island, additional steps are required in order to allow Saint Paul to diversify its fisheries-based economy beyond crab. With the problems of recapitalization and stock abundance in a number of different fisheries, the time is ripe to actually realign the fishery to make sense, both commercially and from a resource management perspective. Two examples of the precarious nature of Saint Paul's crab-dependent economy have recently come to light: one of the on-shore processing plant that has operated on Saint Paul announced that it will not operate on the island this year with respect to Bering sea snow crab, and that it will only operate for a short time to process king crab; also, a processing barge that has operated off of Saint Paul has announced that it will not be returning to the island this year. The City is highly concerned about the potentially severe economic impact of these developments.

The City, in partnership with the Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Association (CBSFA), the local CDQ fishermen's association, remains engaged in negotiations with processing companies to locate a processor in the Saint Paul Harbor that would allow for multispecies processing, which is necessary to diversify the island's economy. Successful compliance of these negotiations will finally allow a locally owned and/or operated shore-based facility to be operated in the middle of one of the world's richest groundfish fisheries, and relieve Saint Paul's dependence on crab. This, in turn, will provide the harvesting component of the commercial fishing industry an opportunity to harvest pollock, cod and other groundfish and deliver to a shore-based processor close to the resource. The result is that value-added products can be made, there is an increase in efficiency, a decrease in costs and an increase in safety.

However, it has become increasingly clear that additional harbor improvements and infrastructure projects must be completed before a multispecies processor will be able to moor and operate its fish processing plant in the Saint Paul Harbor. These projects include the deepening of the berthing site at the breakwater and reconstruction/improvement of the IHS outfall in order to provide an adequate seafood disposal system.

An important part of the Section 312 analysis is the manner in which the valuable Saint Paul Harbor can be used, through the development of multi-species processing on Saint Paul, to the benefit of the fishing community, the fishing industry, including the fishermen, resource management, and international trade and export. With the temporal and spatial dispersal of the pollock fishery resulting from the Steller sea lion protective measures, the diversification of the Saint Paul Harbor is a critical component of an economic and environmental management program. Improvement of the island's infrastructure will be fundamental in overcoming the obstacles discussed, *supra*.


V. Conclusion.


As discussed *supra*, the Secretary of Commerce has determined in response to a series of previous requests by the City that commercial fishery failures occurred in 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2004 due to a Bering Sea snow crab fishery resource disaster that continued through those years. A determination that commercial fishery failures occurred in 2005 and 2006 due to the continuing fishery resource disaster would help to continue the programs that have been commenced to address the collapse of the Bering Sea crab stocks. The need for a Section 312 determination of a commercial fishery failure in 2005 and 2006 is particularly acute for Saint Paul Island, a fishing community that, as the Secretary has recognized in its previous determinations, has already endured several years of severe economic effects due to the collapse of the crab stocks.

The City of Saint Paul requests that, as in past years, it be recognized as an affected fishing community under Section 312(a) of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and that the Secretary make the determination that (1) the fishery resource disaster that has been recognized as having occurred in the Bering Sea snow crab stocks due to natural conditions persists; and (2) the continued collapse of the Bering Sea snow crab resource in 2005 and 2006 resulted in a commercial fishery failure in both of these years.

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,


Simeon Swetzof, Jr., Mayor


Linda Snow
City Manager

Enclosures

cc: William T. Hogarth, Assistant Administrator, National Marine Fisheries Service
Senator Ted Stevens
Senator Lisa Murkowski
Congressman Don Young
Governor Frank Murkowski
Office of the Governor of the State of Alaska, Washington, D.C.

EXHIBIT 1

	1999						2000		
	Jan-99	Feb-99	Mar-99	Apr-99	May-99	Total	Jan-00	Feb-00	Mar-00
ONSHORE PROCESSORS									
Tribal	127,738	327,141	258,785	12	88,390	782,038	134,841	58,285	128
	\$ 127,738	\$ 327,141	\$ 258,785	\$ 12	\$ 88,390	\$ 782,038	\$ 134,841	\$ 58,285	\$ 128
OFFSHORE PROCESSORS									
Norquest	28,854	88,889	62,772	-	18,842	199,296	56,882	12,224	-
Yard Am Knot	42,817	122,008	94,847	-	31,844	291,514	-	-	-
Yard Am Knot 2000									
Royal Alaskan 2000									
KICILE	32,812	188,467	134,868	87,327	135,847	581,299			
Sister Seabrook	-	388	3,628			3,994	-	-	-
Peter Pan Seabrook	-	87,022	78,308	10,828	18,888	171,858	42,172	-	-
Sea Alaska	-	88,889	44,889	8	8,728	111,276	81,848	78,882	10,811
Independence	-	134,053	77,577	22	21,534	233,186	-	-	-
Sno Pac	-	-	-	-	-	-	31,887	-	-
UNSEA	41,184	147,831	87,155	44,718	32,007	342,873			
	\$ 143,877	\$ 778,638	\$ 583,884	\$ 182,908	\$ 289,282	\$ 1,826,178	\$ 181,848	\$ 91,788	\$ 10,811
	\$ 271,315	\$ 1,908,674	\$ 882,848	\$ 182,912	\$ 334,882	\$ 2,717,212			
FUEL DISTRIBUTORS									
Note: One vendor deals solely with Marine Fuel Sales. The other vendor is a combination of marine fuel and home heating fuel									
	2,218	12,772	13,882	3,778	2,858	34,888	3,336	3,544	6,887
	4,265	38,348	4,186	3,787	1,888	50,416	2,884	1,787	2,558
	\$ 6,483	\$ 51,120	\$ 18,068	\$ 7,565	\$ 4,746	\$ 85,304	\$ 6,220	\$ 5,331	\$ 9,445
HARBOR SERVICES									
Dockage	12,488	16,882	28,228	3,882	2,884	62,138	8,828	4,811	188
Wharfage	12,848	38,231	88,873	11,818	11,388	152,487	3,888	7,348	(1,277)
Marine Fuel Sales	18,888	88,881	14,888	13,883	8,884	134,883	5,887	4,742	6,881
Package Stock Sales	8,888	58,878	28,182	48	8,882	97,880	2,183	3,882	-
Laborer Revenue	388	388	588	-	-	1,364	3,881	4,388	1,536
Rental Revenue	28,328	88,888	87,454	37,828	24,322	236,818	-	-	-
Fuel Profit Sharing	-	-	38,888	-	38,888	77,776	14,888	-	-
	\$ 72,837	\$ 283,838	\$ 247,127	\$ 68,882	\$ 68,847	\$ 738,441	\$ 38,182	\$ 24,883	\$ 8,888
LOCAL BUSINESSES									
TDX Corp	1,881	4,382	12,878	1,888	1,348	21,177	818	1,415	1,888
LEASER TDX	1,888	6,188	12,881	13,823	1,888	36,888	6,888	6,881	7,318
T & A	244	288	248	188	488	1,418	-	-	-
Tribal Gov't	-	-	1,815	1,281	1,748	4,854	1,884	1,788	1,388
AC Store	8,828	13,288	13,553	8,883	8,288	48,218	1,888	4,188	5,828
	\$ 10,311	\$ 24,123	\$ 40,343	\$ 23,886	\$ 11,868	\$ 108,623	\$ 9,848	\$ 12,841	\$ 16,288

Note: Revenues received are always based on prior year's catch

**CITY OF SAINT PAUL
REVENUE IMPACTS
OPILO CRAB FISHERY COLLAPSE**

		2004					2005		
Apr-03	Total	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Total	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05
	195,299	136,404	41,173	580		178,157	173,852	19,572	
\$	\$ 195,299	\$ 136,404	\$ 41,173	\$ 580	\$	\$ 178,157	\$ 173,852	\$ 19,572	\$

		2004					2005		
Apr-03	Total	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Total	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05
	66,185	56,579				56,579			
	42,172	27,428				27,428	85,888		
\$	\$ 108,357	\$ 83,907	\$ 63,294	\$ 5,891	\$ 75	\$ 184,035	\$ 76,296	\$ 86,328	\$ 490
\$	\$ 204,145	\$ 220,400	\$ 63,294	\$ 5,891	\$ 75	\$ 271,740	\$ 172,254	\$ 86,328	\$ 490

		2004					2005		
Apr-03	Total	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Total	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05
2,173	14,899	1,673	1,218	18		2,907	4,828	3,352	3,128
793	7,199	2,788	7,007	3,630	3,614	17,138	750	712	1,866
\$	\$ 2,925	\$ 4,461	\$ 8,225	\$ 3,645	\$ 3,614	\$ 20,046	\$ 5,418	\$ 4,194	\$ 4,992

		2004					2005			
Apr-03	Total	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Total	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05	
13,790	27,690	4,359	3,614	2,688	2,179	12,740	6,360	3,428	6,412	
9,982	16,824	1,537	5,365	6,957	1,052	17,911	6,988	7,027	16,184	
18,498	35,428	3,698	2,980			6,676	1,505	1,480	3,982	
7,237	12,482	9,682	4,827	393	182	15,184				
2,995	12,458	430				430	129			
20,000	20,000									
71,818	84,424				16,638	16,638	9,207			
\$	\$ 144,888	\$ 214,282	\$ 19,705	\$ 19,579	\$ 9,875	\$ 19,216	\$ 66,772	\$ 23,080	\$ 11,846	\$ 27,287

		2004					2005		
Apr-03	Total	Jan-04	Feb-04	Mar-04	Apr-04	Total	Jan-05	Feb-05	Mar-05
880	4,320	7,873	2,316	4,895	422	15,510	839	1,947	633
5,398	23,927	6,819	6,189	7,257	6,537	26,805	6,704	6,233	7,408
1,414	6,382	1,778	888	1,478	1,448	5,690	830	492	1,893
1,855	13,219	1,704	3,894	5,287	1,612	12,697	1,704	6,165	3,710
\$	\$ 9,865	\$ 47,358	\$ 18,274	\$ 13,986	\$ 16,796	\$ 62,220	\$ 9,977	\$ 14,377	\$ 12,782

		2008				
Apr-05	Total	Jan-08	Feb-08	Mar-08	Apr-08	Total
	190,723	64,266	45,828	24,447	56,985	191,526
\$	190,723	\$ 64,266	\$ 45,828	\$ 24,447	\$ 56,985	\$ 191,526

		2008				
Apr-05	Total	Jan-08	Feb-08	Mar-08	Apr-08	Total
		3,509	7,359	28,342		37,244
		24,428	12,328	20,075	11,078	67,932
		23,279	15,894	64,832	5,480	
	65,868	11,362	19,478	11,813	(12,988)	28,987
78	133,861					
\$	78 \$ 229,848	\$ 62,572	\$ 65,464	\$ 122,922	\$ 3,500	\$ 136,033
		\$ 128,630	\$ 101,428	\$ 147,370	\$ 62,676	

		2008				
Apr-05	Total	Jan-08	Feb-08	Mar-08	Apr-08	Total
4,428	15,964	7,260	9,900	7,982	5,876	29,861
6,648	11,988	2,707	2,912	6,367	1,620	12,814
\$	12,876	\$ 27,680	\$ 10,000	\$ 12,812	\$ 12,448	\$ 7,504
		\$ 42,466				

		2008				
Apr-05	Total	Jan-08	Feb-08	Mar-08	Apr-08	Total
1,836	16,134	6,540	4,016	16,148	3,317	30,020
12,821	46,211	6,077	6,747	18,366	1,480	27,949
15,017	21,404	3,872	4,411	7,863	3,180	19,127
1,771	1,771	6,938	3,437	4,697	719	14,131
	120	80		40		120
	9,297					
\$	31,544	\$ 93,847	\$ 21,887	\$ 17,610	\$ 43,183	\$ 6,879
		\$ 91,647				

		2008				
Apr-05	Total	Jan-08	Feb-08	Mar-08	Apr-08	Total
766	3,784	646	1,081	1,383	628	4,819
7,049	28,389	1,801	-	3,706	2,834	8,341
		1,838	1,388	1,147	1,182	6,277
	1,704	6,828	5,844	8,225	6,388	28,480
\$	10,719	\$ 46,866	\$ 9,811	\$ 8,944	\$ 14,461	\$ 11,290
		\$ 44,823				